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“EVERYBODY KNOWS WHAT
A PICKET LINE MEANS”:

Picketing before the British Columbia
Court of Appeal

Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker

I

n 1951, it was obvious to Justice Cornelius O’Halloran, one of
the most outspoken members of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal (bcca), that picketing was unlawful. According to him,
“in a unionized city like Vancouver everybody knows what a picket line
means. Many neutral individuals are afraid of patronizing places where
labour picketers none too subtly convey by their organized and militant
presence and patrol the unspoken threat ‘you better not patronize this
place.’”1 O’Halloran’s statement was made in a judgment that held that
two trade unionists who paraded peacefully in front of a restaurant with
signs that stated that the restaurant did not have collective agreements
with the union were acting illegally.2 His equation of picketing with
coercion was not idiosyncratic. In its first one hundred years, despite
several changes in the legal regime governing labour relations in the
province and numerous changes in court membership, unions won only
eight out of the thirty-eight decisions on the legality of picketing and
obtained partial victories in another two (See Table 1 for a numerical
breakdown and Appendix 1 for a complete list of cases).3 However, the
one-sided results obscure the extent of the debate within the bcca,
especially in its early years, over whether there was any room at all for
1
2
3

Aristocratic Restaurants (1947) Ltd. v. Williams et al., [1951] 1 D.L.R. 360, 368.
For more detailed discussion of the case and the holding, see below.
We have not examined the record of the British Columbia Supreme Court, which heard
injunction applications in the first instance. However, we suspect it was similarly hostile to
labour picketing based on the fact that unions were the appellants in twenty-eight of the thirtyeight decisions to reach the bcca. In identifying the universe of picketing cases decided by the
bcca, we have focused on the activity of picketing and consumer leafleting to the exclusion of
boycott (hot) declarations and other forms of industrial action. We have also excluded purely
technical and procedural cases that deal with questions of evidence and contempt cases that
address whether union leaders and picketers complied with injunctions previously issued
by the court. All of the cases were located by conducting Quicklaw searches and following
up on cases cited within those cases. No archival searches were conducted. Arsens, the one
unreported case we have, was referred to in one of the reported cases.
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lawful picketing as well as over the greater success achieved by unions
in cases heard in the post-Charter era.
Table 1

bcca Picketing Cases, 1908-2008
1908-48

1949-58

1959-73

1973-82

1982-2008

Total

Employer wins

4

4

8

5

7

28

Union wins

0

1

2

0

5

8

Split

0

0

0

2

0

2

Total

4

5

10

7

12

38

This article documents the one-sidedness of the bcca’s picketing
jurisprudence, highlights the legal reasons given by the judges to
support their conclusions, and examines the extent of disagreement
over picketing within the court. We have grouped the bcca’s picketing
decisions into five periods, with each period representing a different
mix of how collective bargaining and picketing were regulated. The first
period, from 1908 to 1948, was marked by a combination of common law
and ineffective statutory immunities. In the second period, from the
passage of statutory collective bargaining in 1947 to the Trade Union Act
in 1959, the court used breaches of labour statutes to perfect common law
causes of action. In the middle period, which lasted through the 1960s
until the early 1970s, the court interpreted the statutory code of picketing
contained in the 1959 legislation very narrowly. With the introduction
of the Labour Code, in 1973, which sought to severely limit the courts’
regulation of picketing, the bcca whittled away at the labour board’s
authority over picketing. Since 1982, the court has refused every attempt
to use the Charter’s guarantee of fundamental rights to create a protected
space for picketing, but it has become more willing to accept the labour
board’s jurisdiction over picketing and to tolerate peaceful picketing in
cases that do not involve the Constitution. In the conclusion, we suggest
some possible explanations for the bcca’s consistent hostility towards
picketing.
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IN THE BEGINNING

Between 1908 and 1948, picketing was governed by a messy amalgam
of common law, civil statute, and criminal law. Its legality could be
challenged most effectively through injunctions or the Criminal Code.
An injunction is a particularly effective means of stopping picketing
since it is a judicial order to stop specified conduct, the breach of which
amounts to contempt of court. Between 1908 and 1948, there were three
cases that reached the bcca, and each involved peaceful picketing in
front of a movie theatre, although the issues in dispute and the causes of
action differed. These cases led to a great deal of judicial disagreement.
However, the result in each was the same; the court upheld the restrictions on picketing.
The Schuberg case arose out of a strike in 1926 by unionized projectionists against the Empress Theatre in Vancouver after it laid off two
union members. The striking workers distributed handbills to patrons,
stating that the theatre was unfair to organized labour, while trade union
members drove automobiles back and forth in front of the theatre with
banners declaring the same. The employer obtained an injunction and
the union appealed.4 The fundamental question before the bcca was
whether workers enjoyed a common law privilege to peacefully picket
their employer in order to advance their collective interests and, if not,
to what extent the 1902 BC Trades-Union Act 5 (tua) provided statutory
immunity from the common law.
The panel of four judges hearing the case split evenly. Chief Justice
James Alexander Macdonald and Justice Albert McPhillips were of
the view that the picketing was unlawful at common law, although
they had different reasons for their shared finding.6 They also narrowly
interpreted the scope of the immunity granted by British Columbia’s
1902 statute. Section 2 of the tua provided that trade unions were not
subject to injunctions or liable for communicating facts or persuading
4

5

6

Schuberg v. Local Internat. Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees et al., [1926] 3 D.L.R. 166. Mary
F. Southin discussed this case in an article published in the Vancouver Bar Association’s
magazine, The Advocate, before she joined the bcca in 1988. See Mary F. Southin, “The Courts
and Labour Injunctions,” The Advocate 28 (1970): 74-84. In practice, Southin represented the
Plumbers’ Union in their successful appeal of the Becker case, discussed below. She was the
first woman elected as a bencher (in 1971) and was widely known as an outspoken judge who
issued a series of controversial decisions in a range of cases. We thank Hamar Foster for
bringing this article to our attention.
S.B.C. 1902, c. 66. A.W.R. Carrothers, “A Legislative History of the BC Trade-Unions Act:
The Rossland Miners’ Case,” UBC Legal Notes 2, 4 (1956): 339-46. British Columbia was the
only province that provided some statutory immunity to trade unionists from common law
liability. As we shall see, however, its scope was narrowly interpreted by judges.
Schuberg v. Local Internat. Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees et al., [1927] 2 D.L.R. 20 at 21.
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by fair or reasonable argument, while s. 3 granted similar immunity
for publishing information about the strike or urging persons not to
purchase or consume the struck employer’s products. In the judges’
view, the statute did not provide immunity for civil conspiracies to injure
trade and, moreover, the picketing in this case was not communicating
facts, persuading by argument, or publishing information but, rather,
expressing a conclusion.7
In contrast, Justices Archer Martin and Malcolm Archibald Macdonald took a much broader view of both the common law privilege to
picket and the scope of statutory immunity granted. With respect to the
protected communication under the tua, both held that the expression
“unfair to labour” was permissible and that s. 3 clearly permitted a union
to urge members of the public not to patronize an employer.8 However,
because of the equal division, the judgment of the lower court stood.9
The sharply contrasting views of the judges in Schuberg were replayed in the bcca’s two other picketing judgments during this period.
Rex v. Richards & Woolridge involved an appeal from a conviction for
criminal watching and besetting for picketing in front of the Edison
Theatre in New Westminster. The same panel of judges that decided
Schuberg heard this appeal, and again it split evenly over the issue.
The question was whether the watching and besetting provision in
the Criminal Code made all picketing, including peaceful picketing,
criminal.10 The stipulation in the Code that the section applied to persons
who watched and beset “wrongfully and without lawful authority”
seemed to make no difference to Chief Justice Macdonald or Justice
McPhillips.11 McPhillips took it as accepted law that picketing of all
kinds wrongfully interfered with the right to do business. The picketing
here, therefore, was wrongful and so the watching and besetting was
criminal.12
Once again, Justices Martin and M.A. Macdonald dissented. Martin
was of the view that the activity in question clearly came within the
sphere of activity protected by the tua and, therefore, that the union
7

8
9

10
11
12

Ibid. at 22, 31. McPhillips did not deal with the part of s. 3 that permits trade unionists to
urge persons not to purchase the employer’s products.
Ibid. at 22-29, 38-41.
For a critique of the judgment, see Bora Laskin, “Picketing: A Comparison of Certain
Canadian and American Doctrines,” Canadian Bar Review 15 (1937): 10 at 16, 19. The resolution
of the dispute is unknown, but whatever it was, it did not deter the Communist Party from
subsequently holding the Lenin Memorial Concert at the Empress Theatre on 21 January
1937 (Glenbow Museum, Image No. NA-3634-16).
Rex v. Richards & Woolridge, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 332.
Ibid. at 334.
Ibid. at 340-45.
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had lawful authority to watch and beset; Macdonald held that, without
wrongful behaviour, such as creating a nuisance or engaging in violence
or intimidation, watching and besetting was not criminal. Thus, the
peaceful picketing that occurred here was clearly permitted.13 Again,
an equal split allowed the conviction to stand.
The third case involved a dispute that arose when the owner of the
Hollywood Theatre in Vancouver fired the one unionized projectionist
on staff in order to hire his own son, who was not a union member,
allegedly in violation of the agreement he signed with the union.14
Initially, the picketing was confined to two people carrying signs to the
effect that the theatre did not employ union projectionists. However,
a larger solidarity picket involving some sixty to seventy people was
organized by the district labour council, and the theatre was also placed
on a “we do not patronize” list. An interim (temporary) injunction was
issued and upheld by a unanimous bcca.15
The case went to trial and the trial judge awarded a permanent
injunction and damages. On appeal, Martin, who was now the chief
justice, would have allowed the initial picketing on the basis of his
earlier reading of the tua but, for reasons not stated, found that the
mass picketing was unprotected by statute.16 However, the two more
recently appointed justices, William McQuarrie and O’Halloran, perhaps
offended by the union’s interference with the “natural” desire of a father
to train his son to enter the family business, hewed to a much tougher
line, and they found all of the picketing to be wrongful.
Justice O’Halloran’s decision merits consideration as one of the
most anti-union judgments written at the appellate level in Canadian
history. He declared: “[T]he term ‘peaceful picketing’ has no place in
the law of this Province. It is a negation in terms … Without intimidation, obstruction and moral coercion [picketing] was useless for the
purposes employed; with them it was provocative.”17 He concluded that
the picketing received no protection from the Trade Union Act: “By no
straining of the language may such terms as ‘communicating,’ ‘persuading,’ ‘recommending,’ ‘advising,’ ‘warning,’ and ‘urging’ be extended
to include marching backwards and forward in an organized manner in
13
14

15

16
17

Ibid. at 334-40, 345-47.
At the time of writing the Hollywood Theatre was still in operation. At the top of its web
page it proudly states: “FAMILY OWNED & OPERATED FOR 73 YEARS,” http://
www.hollywoodtheatre.ca (viewed 20 May 2009).
Hollywood Theatres Ltd. v. Tenney et al., [1939] 2 D.L.R. 745. (Hollywood Theatres (1)). See
Southin’s discussion of this case, supra note 4, 77.
Hollywood Theatres v. Tenney, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 452. (Hollywood Theatres (2)).
Ibid. at 459.
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front of the employer’s premises, let alone include the organized mass
demonstration of June 11.”18 By taking action to enforce its interpretation
of the contract, O’Halloran claimed that the union sought to “override
the ‘rule of law’ … Any attempt to place labour or business controversies
outside of organized society and refuse to subject them to social controls is
repugnant equally to our common law and our statute law.”19 The irony is
that the union had to resort to self-help to enforce its collective agreement
because English and Canadian courts had previously ruled that collective
agreements could not be enforced in courts. Moreover, O’Halloran failed
to acknowledge that the employer had engaged in self-help; instead of
taking the dispute over the closed shop in the collective agreement to
court, the employer simply fired the unionized worker over the union’s
objection that this was a breach of their agreement.20
It is striking that all the picketing cases that reached the bcca during
this period arose in the context of disputes between movie projectionists
and theatre owners. This was hardly the work setting most prone to
violent labour confrontations, which were far more common in the
primary resource sector, on the waterfront, and with the unemployed.
However, in those contexts injunctions were not the legal instrument
of choice; rather, employers relied on the police and the criminal law
to control disruptive worker collective action.21 Picketing in front of
theatres in urban locations may have seemed particularly problematic to
judges because it targeted consumers as much as owners and, therefore,
may have been seen as adversely affecting the rights of “innocent” third
parties.22 Moreover, movie-going was connected with the growth of mass
consumption in the twentieth century, which itself required the creation
of common orderly spaces where middle-class patrons could safely mix
with working-class viewers.23
18
19
20

21

22

23

Ibid. at 464.
Ibid. at 471.
See also Bora Laskin, “Labour Law: 1923-1947,” Canadian Bar Review 26 (1948): 286, 295-96
(referring to O’Halloran’s judgment as a “complete emasculation” of the tua).
Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada,
1900-66 (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, Study 22 1968) 202-06, 227-70; Judy Fudge
and Eric Tucker, Labour before the Law (Oxford: Toronto, 2001) 153-262.
In that regard, it is interesting to speculate about the relation between O’Halloran’s hostility
towards consumer picketing and his dissent, less than one year later in Rogers v. Clarence
Hotel Ltd, [1940] 3 D.L.R. 583, in which he would have allowed a Black man to sue a hotel for
refusing to serve him on the basis of his race. Perhaps it was a belief that the common law
ought to protect the freedom of the individual consumer that connected these positions. For
a discussion of the Rogers case and O’Halloran’s dissent, see James W. St. G. Walker, “Race,”
Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1997) 174-76.
Paul S. Moore, “Movie Palaces on Canadian Downtown Main Streets: Montreal, Toronto,
and Vancouver,” Urban History Review 32, 2 (2004): 3.
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In any event, notwithstanding significant dissent, by the end of the
Second World War the bcca had distinguished itself by having one of
the most restrictive views of picketing in Canada, despite the fact that
British Columbia was the only province with legislation granting trade
unions a modicum of immunity from civil liability. The tua had been
“reduced to impotence by courts whose fixed idea about the nature of
legitimate business conflict allowed little sympathy for effective trade
union activity.”24
COMMON LAW CONTROLS IN A STATUTORY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REGIME 1947-58

Along with the other provinces, British Columbia enacted a statutory
collective bargaining scheme after the Second World War. The 1947
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (icaa) provided unions with
protection against unfair employer practices and gave them the right to
become certified as the bargaining agent of a defined group of workers if
the union could demonstrate majority support. It also imposed controls
on the right to engage in industrial action by prohibiting strikes during
the life of the collective agreement and requiring the parties to undergo
conciliation before resorting to strikes or lockouts. The legal regulation
of picketing, however, remained a matter for the courts. In this period
the courts continued to address the scope for picketing permitted under
the criminal and common law and the scope of immunity granted by
the Trade Union Act. But now they also had to deal with the implications
of the icaa for the law of picketing.
The second case to reach the bcca under the new regime was
Aristocratic Restaurants.25 The employer operated a chain of restaurants,
but the union had only succeeded in organizing and becoming certified
under the icaa as bargaining agent for the employees at one of the
plaintiff’s restaurants. The union had been unable to negotiate a collective
agreement for that restaurant, and the employees there quit the union.
24

25

I.M. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University
Industrial Relations Centre, 1967) 55. For another lengthy parsing of the tua 1906 and the
court’s interpretation, see A.W.R. Carrothers, “The Right to Picket in British Columbia:
A Study in Statutory Interpretation,” University of Toronto Law Journal 9 (1951): 250, 263-75.
[1951] 1 D.L.R. 360. The first case, Arsens v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 459,
was unreported and no written decision has been located. However, there is an entry in the
order book, dated 14 June 1950, reversing the decision of Wood, J., who had dissolved the
interlocutory injunction issued by Macfarlane, J. The bcca panel consisted of O’Halloran,
Robertson, and Bird. See British Columbia Archives (bca), GR-1572, vol. 16, no. 2. See also
Southin’s discussion of this case, supra note 4 at 78.
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Despite its lack of members, the union remained the certified bargaining
agent for the employees at the restaurant it had organized. In an attempt
to get a collective agreement for that restaurant, it hired picketers, who,
two at a time, paraded peacefully in front of the restaurant for which
it had bargaining rights as well as in front of the employer’s other restaurants, for which it did not have bargaining rights. The picket signs
stated the fact that these restaurants did not have union agreements. At
trial, Justice John Owen Wilson held that, while it would be unlawful
intimidation to accost prospective patrons and warn them that “this is
a picket line” or to obstruct the entrance to the restaurant, there was
nothing unlawful about what the picketers had done in this case, which
was silently to hold up signs that made truthful statements, even if that
caused damage to the employer.26
Once again, the three justices who heard the employer’s appeal
disagreed on the result, although the majority, consisting of Justices
O’Halloran and Sidney Smith, allowed the appeal.27 O’Halloran wrote
another lengthy judgment dealing with the legality of picketing under
the pre-existing law as well as with the effect of the icaa. He was clearly
not pleased with Wilson’s attempt to treat some parts of his judgment in
Hollywood Theatres as non-binding (obiter).28 In his view, all picketing was
wrongful even if conducted in silence. O’Halloran supported his claim
with the comments quoted in the opening paragraph of this article.
O’Halloran also addressed the question of whether labour picketing
was permissible other than when the prerequisites for a lawful strike had
been fulfilled. He was firmly of the view that it was not; the icaa was to
be read as a complete code that gave unions certain rights in exchange
for a restriction on the privilege to resort to economic pressure until the
machinery of conciliation had been exhausted. As a result, picketing that
occurred without strict compliance with the requirements of the icaa
26

27

28

[1950] 4 D.L.R. 548. Wilson was a small-town lawyer prior to his first judicial appointment
to the Cariboo County Bench in the 1930s. According to John Stanton, a union-side lawyer,
Wilson was a well respected member of the establishment, but his practical experience in the
North and his common sense informed his judgments. See John Stanton, Never Say Die! The
Life and Times of a Pioneer Labour Lawyer (Ottawa: Steel Rail Publishing, 1987) 112. In a 1979
interview, Justice Wilson stated that he was involved in labour disputes as a conciliator early
in his career and that as a young practicing lawyer in Prince George he felt very sorry for the
workmen, because they were getting the worst of it. However, he also went on to say that he no
longer felt that way at the time of the interview. See Transcript of Interview with the Honourable
J.O. Wilson (Aural History Programme, British Columbia Legal History Collection Project,
Faculty of Law , University of British Columbia, June/September 1979), 28-29.
Supra note 25 at 374-81. Justice Robertson disagreed with the view that a strike that violated
the icaa lost the immunities granted by the tua. Moreover, he held that picketing was not
per se tortious or criminal.
Ibid. at 366.
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for a lawful strike was itself unlawful.29
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (scc), the first
bcca picketing case to come before that court. A majority of the scc
allowed the appeal, Charles H. Locke J. and Thibaudeau Rinfret C.J.C.
dissenting.30 The multiplicity of judgments that created the majority make
it difficult to state a clear holding, but the important points of agreement
were that peaceful picketing was neither criminal watching and besetting
nor per se tortious. Moreover, the failure to comply with the requirements
of the icaa was not relevant to the legality of the picketing. For the first
time, the scc clearly affirmed the legality of peaceful picketing. But the
limits of the judgment, and especially of the courts’ commitment to it,
soon became apparent, and the BC courts played a leading role in the
process of eroding its impact.31
The first bcca judgment on picketing after Aristocratic was Hammer
v. Kemmis et al.32 The case arose out of an organizing drive at a small
bakery. The employer terminated two bakery employees, and the union
picketed with the aim of pressuring the employer to sign the standard
agreement it had with other wholesale bakeries. The bakery obtained an
injunction, and the union appealed. Justice Frederik Sheppard, writing
for himself and Henry Bird, denied the appeal.33 Once again, however,
the bcca was split as Justice Herbert William Davey dissented. The
majority upheld the trial judge’s finding that the object of the union
was not to advance its own interests but, rather, to punish the bakery
for dismissing the two employees and not signing its agreement. As
well, the means used were unlawful since the pickets “accosted intended
customers, stared in their faces so as to cause the customers to become
frightened and leave without entering the store,” a finding based entirely
on affidavit evidence (which is not subject to cross-examination by the
29

30
31

32
33

Ibid. at 368-74. This aspect of the judgment was endorsed by T.R. Wilcox, “Labour RelationsPicketing-Illegal Strike-Injunction,” Canadian Bar Review 29 (1951): 531 at 535-36 (“the interests
of the community demand that the provisions of the statute designed to promote industrial
peace be exhausted before the parties are free to resort to their own devices”). For a more
critical view, see A.W.R. Carrothers, “The Right to Picket in British Columbia: A Study in
Statute Interpretation,” University of Toronto Law Journal 9 (1952): 250, 283-87.
[1951] 3 D.L.R. 769.
Earl E. Palmer, “The Short, Unhappy Life of the ‘Aristocratic’ Doctrine,” University of Toronto
Law Journal 13 (1960): 166.
(1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 684.
Henry Bird had been counsel to Pacific Lime Ltd. during a bitterly fought and violent strike
in Blubber Bay in 1938. The company invoked its common law rights to evict workers from
company housing and to limit their mobility in a company town. On the strike, see Andrew
Parnaby, “What’s Law Got to Do with It? The iwa and the Politics of State Power in British
Columbia, 1935-1939,” Labour/Le Travail 44 (Fall 1999): 9. For a brief discussion of Bird’s role,
see Stanton, supra note 26 at 19.
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other party) submitted by the employer. According to the majority, none
of this behaviour was protected under the tua since these activities went
beyond communicating or persuading by fair or reasonable argument.
And finally, they distinguished this case from Aristocratic because, in this
instance, the defendants committed wrongful acts that went beyond the
fair and reasonable actions of the picketers in the former case.34
The majority decision in Hammer seemed to signal the unwillingness
of the bcca to accept the scc’s more liberal view of the scope of lawful
picketing. Thus, it was somewhat surprising when, two years later, in
Becker, the next picketing case to reach it, a unanimous panel of the bcca,
which included O’Halloran and Smith, allowed an appeal and set aside
an injunction. This was the first time a union won a picketing case in
the bcca.35
The case arose when unionized plumbers who were lawfully locked
out by their employer responded by peacefully picketing the construction
site where they had been employed. As a result of the picketing, other
construction workers on the same site refused to cross. O’Halloran
accepted that the scc had rejected his view that all picketing was
intimidation, and he also found no evidence that the picketing at the
construction site was otherwise wrongful. The picket signs simply stated
that the workers were locked out, and there was no evidence of a civil
conspiracy to injure trade. The union’s appeal was successful and the
injunction was lifted.
While Becker indicated the court’s acceptance of that part of the
scc’s holding in Aristocratic that picketing was not per se wrongful
intimidation, it remained an open question whether the bcca would
also embrace the scc’s holding that the failure to comply with the requirements of collective bargaining legislation did not make picketing
wrongful for that reason alone. The answer came three months later in
the Therien case,36 which arose when the Teamsters’ union threatened to
picket the employer unless it complied with the union’s interpretation of
the collective agreement and terminated its contract with an independent
contractor, Therien, who was not a member of the union. Despite some
points of divergence among the three judgments, they agree on one key
issue: a breach of the labour relations statute constituted the unlawful
means that made picketing or other collective action tortious under
34
35

36

Supra note 32 at 702-07.
Becker Construction Co. Ltd. v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipe Fitting Industry et al. (1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 354.
Therien v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 646 (Davey dissenting
in part).
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common law. All three judges expressed concern that the threat to picket
violated the statutory requirement to resolve disputes over the interpretation and application of a collective agreement through arbitration.
The case was appealed to the scc, which unanimously upheld the
bcca. Charles Locke J., who had dissented from the scc’s judgment in
Aristocratic Restaurant, wrote the main opinion. It is noteworthy that
Locke, who was appointed to the scc in 1947 directly from his BC law
practice, had represented lumber companies resisting the International
Woodworkers’ efforts to organize their employees in the early 1940s,
arguing that the union was opposed to the war effort.37 In his Therien
opinion, Locke J. agreed with the bcca that breach of statute could
constitute the unlawful means requirement of a common law tort. He
also agreed that the threat to strike violated the arbitration provision
and, therefore, made the union liable for interfering with another man’s
method of gaining his living by illegal means.38
By the end of the second period, the bcca continued to take a very
narrow view of the scope for lawful picketing. Although the court
accepted the scc’s rebuke that not all peaceful picketing was either
criminal watching or besetting or tortious, it was still prone to find
that the union either had an unlawful purpose or had used unlawful
means and, thus, had exceeded the narrow limits available for lawful
picketing.
INTERPRETING THE FIRST
LEGISLATIVE PICKETING CODE: 1959-73

In 1959, the BC legislature passed a new trade union act, which codified
the law of picketing and union liability.39 The legislation was prompted
by a spate of controversial injunctions that precipitated a study of the
Trade-Unions Act.40 The new Trade-Unions Act provided a very restrictive
definition of lawful picketing. Lawful picketing could not involve acts
that were otherwise unlawful; it could take place only during a legal
strike or lockout; it was restricted to the employer’s place of business;
and it was limited to persuading or endeavouring to persuade someone
37
38
39

40

Stanton, supra note 26 at 61-67.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al. v. Therien (1960), 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1, at 13.
Trade-Unions Act, S.B.C. 1959, c. 90. For a detailed analysis of the statute and its relation
to previous law, see A.W.R. Carrothers, “The British Columbia Trade-Unions Act, 1959,”
Canadian Bar Review 38 (1960): 295. For a brief note on the statute published under the same
title by the same author, see University of Toronto Law Journal 13 (1960): 278.
Carrothers, Labour Injunction. For background on the legislation, see Jamieson, Times of
Trouble, 374-86.
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not to enter into the employer’s place of business, handle the employer’s
products, or do business with the employer. The 1959 Trade-Unions Act
also created a statutory right of action against trade unions that violated
the labour relations statute or picketed illegally. All that the unions
gained from the legislation was limited immunity against liability for
civil conspiracies to injure.41
The bcca’s approach to labour relations conflict after 1959 was best
summed up by Mary F. Southin in an article she published in The
Advocate before she joined the bcca: “While the Court of Appeal may
no longer think that strikes and picketing are the 8th and 9th deadly
sins, it nevertheless[,] with all deference[,] still does not understand the
dynamics of labour disputes.”42 As in the earlier periods, and as Southin
indicates, the bcca interpreted the law in the manner that most restricted
the scope for legal picketing, although, once again, strong dissents were
frequent.
The issue of picketing at a site at which employees of other employers
were employed, known as a common site of employment, arose in the
first case to reach the bcca in this period, Pacific Coast Terminals.43 The
longshoremen’s union was on a lawful strike against the BC Shipping
Federation and placed pickets at the entrances to the docks, which were
also the entrances to the Pacific Coast Terminal warehouses. Although
there was no dispute with Pacific Coast Terminal, the union refused to
issue passes to its unionized employees, and, as a result, they refused to
cross. The application by Pacific Coast Terminal to prohibit picketing
at these entrances was granted in the first instance on the basis that
the object of the union was to interfere with the plaintiff employer’s
operations to bring pressure on the struck employer. A unanimous bcca
upheld the decision.
The desire to narrowly limit the impact of strikes to the immediate
parties, even in the context of common site employment, manifested
itself again in Koss v. Konn et al.,44 in which a representative of the
carpenters’ union informed a contractor that all of the carpenters on a
job would have to be union members. When the contractor continued to
hire non-union carpenters, the defendant appeared outside the job site
41
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Union members would not be liable for actions that would not be wrongful if committed by
an individual. The statute also limited the availability of interim injunctions against lawful
strikes under the labour relations act to situations where they were necessary to safeguard
the public order or prevent substantial and irreparable injury to property – a provision that
largely codified the existing common law.
Supra note 4 at 78.
(1959), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 249.
(1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 242.
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with a sign stating that non-union men were working, which resulted in
some suppliers refusing to deliver material to the construction site. The
plaintiff obtained an injunction on the basis that the picketing violated
the 1959 tua. The union appealed on the ground that it was not attempting
to persuade but merely to provide information and that, to the extent
the tua prohibited such communication, the legislation was ultra vires
the province’s jurisdiction since restrictions on freedom of speech were
a matter of federal jurisdiction. Writing for the majority, Justice Charles
Tysoe rejected the union’s claim that it was not attempting to persuade.
He drew an analogy between picketing and torture to make the point
that persuasion could take place without words: “I am sure the unfortunate
victims of the rack or the thumbscrew required no words from their
torturers to make them understand the purpose behind and the results
expected of the ordeal they were undergoing … I mention these things
to illustrate the wide significance of the word ‘persuade’ and to show how
conduct can be as powerful a means of persuasion as words.”45
Turning to the activity in question, Tysoe continued: “The defendant
was not giving out this information in the abstract … He must have
hoped for some result from his conduct and I think every girl and boy
of high school age would know his hope, his intention and his purpose
was to persuade persons not to do any or some of the things set out [in
the statute].”46 Moreover, according to him, this restriction was properly
a matter within the provincial power to legislate with respect to property
and civil rights since its “true object … is … protection of the liberty
of a person to carry on his legitimate business … and to the use of his
premises without interference, except when he is an employer who is
himself involved in a legal strike or a lock-out.”47
Justice Thomas Norris disagreed strongly. He noted that a penal statute
should be constructed narrowly to limit the scope of its prohibitions
and that there was a legitimate distinction between merely conveying
information and persuading. On the basis of a narrow interpretation of
the meaning of persuasion, Norris would have upheld the jurisdiction of
the province. However, if the limitation on expressive activities was to be
read more broadly, then he doubted that the province had the authority
to legislate.48
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Ibid. at 265.
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The 1959 statute clearly prohibited secondary picketing (picketing
other than at the site of the employer’s place of business), and the bcca
indicated its strong support for this position in Bartle & Gibson, where an
injunction had been issued to prohibit picketing in front of stores selling
the struck employer’s products. The union challenged the injunction on a
variety of technical grounds, but the court would have none of it. Justice
Tysoe, writing for a unanimous bench, dismissed all three grounds of
appeal and, in conclusion, stated: “We all know, unfortunately, persons
who have no interest whatsoever in a labour dispute will insert themselves
into that dispute and they will cause no end of trouble. The fact that
there is a restraining order against a union does not seem to affect them.
They will pay no attention.”49
The bcca was also called upon to address the legality of primary site
picketing during a lawful strike on shopping centre property. In Zeller’s
(Western), the court was faced with an application for an injunction
from the employer, a tenant in the shopping centre, based on the claim
that the picketing interfered with access to its premises and therefore
constituted a nuisance, which made it “otherwise unlawful” and so in
violation of the 1959 tua. The end result was truly bizarre, reflecting the
continuing conflict within the bcca over the scope for workers’ collective
action. In the first round of litigation, the majority opinion, again written
by Tysoe, and endorsed by Sheppard, took a very restrictive approach,
suggesting that picketing on a right of way without the consent of the
owner would almost inevitably constitute a nuisance because it would
interfere with employees’ and potential customers’ access to the employer’s
property. Tysoe concluded, “I cannot conceive that any picketing of the
nature which I suspect the appellant desires to engage in would not
constitute such unlawful interference. If, however, it would not, the
restraining order does not stand in the appellant’s way.” 50 Justice John
Owen Wilson, who it will be recalled as a BC Supreme Court judge
incurred the displeasure of Justice O’Halloran by attempting to narrow
O’Halloran’s anti-picketing holding in Hollywood Theatres, dissented.
In his view, unlike in trespass cases, which involve actual entry onto
the employer’s property, not every unauthorized entry onto a common
area of a shopping centre that was used to gain access to the employer’s
49
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Bartle & Gibson Co. Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 (1971), 18
D.L.R. (3d) 232 at 238.
Zeller’s (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Food and Drug Clerks Union, Local 1518 (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d)
581 (hereinafter Zeller’s 1).
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property amounted to a nuisance; rather, he argued, there must be
proof of injury from the legal picketing, and, since none was offered,
the injunction ought to have been refused.
Despite the clear implication of Tysoe’s judgment, the union decided
to test the waters and continued to picket peacefully. On the employer’s
application, the picketers were convicted of contempt for violating the
injunction. The union appealed and the matter came before a differently
constituted panel of the bcca, consisting of Justices Sherwood Lett,
Davey, and Sheppard. This time the court upheld the right of striking
workers to picket. Writing for the bcca, Davey expressed the view that
the picketing clearly would have been lawful if conducted on a public
street. The question, then, was whether otherwise lawful behaviour
became unlawful when performed on a private easement in the context
of a shopping centre to which the public was invited. For Davey, the
answer was clear: “No significant distinction can be drawn in this case
between picketing on a public sidewalk and on the privately owned
right of way.”51 Rather than confront the clear difference between this
view and the earlier view expressed in Zellers 1, Davey squared the circle
citing the factual differences but did not attempt to identify the legally
relevant ways in which the picketers’ conduct differed in the two cases. As
a result, the right of shopping centre tenants to enjoin picketing activity
on mall property seemed to depend on the luck of the judicial draw.
Davey, however, raised the possibility that the landlord could base an
application for an injunction on trespass,52 which was the path followed
in future shopping-centre picketing litigation and was embraced by the
scc in Harrison v. Carswell, a case from Manitoba.53
Five other picketing cases were heard by the bcca in this period, four
of which went against the union, although in two of the cases that the
union lost there was a dissent. Two cases were about procedure and cut
in different directions. In the first, the bcca relaxed the standard an
employer had to meet regarding presenting a fair question of law and
51
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Zeller’s (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Food and Drug Clerks Union, Local 1518 (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d)
582 at 586 (hereinafter Zeller’s 2).
Ibid. at 586-87.
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 200. For a discussion of the Zeller’s decisions, see H.W. Arthurs, “Labour
Law: Picketing on Shopping Centres,” Canadian Bar Review 43 (1965): 357. The unionization
drive at Zeller’s was defeated, a fact noted by R.C. Haynes, “The Labour Movement and the
Injunction in British Columbia,” in BC Federation of Labour Injunction Conference (7 January
1967, mimeo). On the history of shopping centre picketing and Harrison v. Carswell, see Philip
Girard and Jim Phillips, “A Certain Malaise: Harrison v. Carswell, Shopping Centre Picketing,
and the Limits of the Postwar Settlement,” in Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, eds., Work on Trial:
Cases in Legal Context (Toronto: Irwin and The Osgoode Society, forthcoming 2010).

68

bc studies

establishing irreparable damage as a condition of obtaining an injunction,
while, in the second, the court dissolved an injunction on the ground
that the employer failed to meet the onus of proving irreparable loss.54
In two other judgments, the bcca narrowly interpreted what constituted
an employer’s place of business and respected corporate divisions within
a large, functionally integrated enterprise,55 while in a third it strictly
interpreted the requirement to conduct a strike vote by the affected
employees.56 Overall, with the exception of Zellers 2 and Goloff, the bcca
continued its tradition of narrowly interpreting the scope for legal picketing.57 According to Southin, “faced with this social struggle [between
employers and unions] the Courts have a choice. They can look at the
words of the legislature and grant injunctions with abandon or they
can attempt to understand the struggle and to apply existing equitable
doctrines to these new problems.”58
PRESERVING JUDICIAL POWER UNDER
THE BC LABOUR CODE: 1973-82

In 1973, the newly elected ndp government enacted the Labour Code of
British Columbia.59 Although the Code made modest substantive changes
to the law, it struck a blow to the courts’ historic role of regulating
picketing through the use of damages and injunctions by conferring
exclusive jurisdiction on the labour board to deal with these matters,
except in situations where there was an immediate and serious danger
to life and health.60 This restriction was a response to the BC Federation
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Flanders Installations Ltd. v. International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-450 et al. (1968) 66
D.L.R. (2d) 438 (Davey dissenting) (injunction upheld); Goloff v. International Woodworkers
of America Local 1-405 (1959), 29 W.W.R. 511 (injunction dissolved). Southin was very critical
of the court’s analysis in Flanders. She noted that the court simply failed to appreciate the
damage that the union suffered when the injunction was issued. See supra note 4, 78-80.
Imperial Oil Limited v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 9-601 et
al. (1969), 69 W.W.R. 702; Canada Safeway Limited v. Allied Workers, Local 373, [1974] B.C.J.
No. 51.
Terra Nova Motor Inn Ltd. v. Beverage Dispensers & Culinary Workers Union, Local 835 et al.
(1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 693 (Justice Nathan Nemetz dissenting).
Thomas Berger, “The Use of Injunctions in Labour Disputes” (BC Federation of Labour
Injunction Conference, 7 January 1967, mimeo), argued that the 1959 Act and its interpretation
drastically curtailed the right to peacefully picket and to disseminate information and that
it was responsible for the increased use of injunctions in BC labour disputes.
Supra note 4, 81.
Labour Code of British Columbia Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122.
The exception to exclusive provincial jurisdiction was subsequently expanded by the ndp
government to allow courts to act where “a wrongful act or omission … causes an immediate
danger or serious injury to any individual or causes an actual obstruction or physical damage
to property.” See S.B.C. 1974-75, c. 33, s. 8. This is the wording of the current exception.
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of Labour’s demand for the elimination of courts’ injunctive powers in
labour disputes. However, as Professor Harry Arthurs predicted, depriving courts of jurisdiction, rather than abolishing common law causes
of action or immunizing the parties to an industrial dispute from their
application, left the door open for the courts to assert an ongoing role
in defining the permissible limits of economic conflict.61
Exclusive board jurisdiction over picketing could be limited in two
ways. First, if the labour conflict was under federal jurisdiction, then the
provincial Code did not apply and courts could continue to regulate the
picketing on the basis of the common law. Two of the seven picketing
cases heard by the bcca during this period successfully challenged
provincial jurisdiction on this basis.62 The other way for the court to
maintain its direct involvement in the regulation of industrial conflict
was to interpret narrowly the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to the labour board. This was the tack taken in two cases. In one the
bcca held that the Code did not apply to the picketing of provincially
regulated employers by a federally certified union.63 In the other, it held
that the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction over picketing did not
extend to actions brought by third parties who had not been declared
to be involved in the labour dispute.64
Unsurprisingly, every time the bcca found it had jurisdiction, it also
upheld or granted an injunction.65 In two cases, however, it modified
terms of the injunction to make it less restrictive. In one case, it limited
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H.W. Arthurs, “‘Dullest Bill’: Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia,” University of British Columbia Law Review 9 (1974): 280 at 301-13.
Western Stevedoring Co. Ltd. et al. v. Pulp Paper & Woodworkers of Canada (1975), 61 D.L.R.
(3d) 701; Jebsens (U.K.) Ltd. v. Lambert et al. (1975), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 564.
British Columbia Ferry Corp. v. Telecommunications Workers Union et al. (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d)
307; affirmed (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 159 (scc).
Better Value Furniture (chwk) Ltd. v. Vancouver Distribution Centre Ltd. et al. (1981) 122 D.L.R.
(3d) 12. For a critique of this decision and, more generally, of the reassertion of judicial
jurisdiction in labour disputes, see Ian Donald, “The Return of the Injunction,” in Joseph
Weiler and Peter Gall, eds., The Labour Code of British Columbia in the 1980s (Calgary and
Vancouver: Carswell, 1984) 147-58. Donald was subsequently appointed to the BC Supreme
Court in 1989 and the bcca in 1994. See below, 73-74.
In Jebsens, the bcca found that: the picketing caused and aimed to cause damage to an innocent third party; there was interference with contractual relations between the plaintiff and
its employees; there was an arguable case for conspiracy to interrupt contractual relations and
procure a breach of contract; there were serious and irreparable damages to the plaintiff; and the
balance of convenience heavily favoured the innocent third party. In Western Stevedoring, the bcca
granted the injunction on the ground that the picketing interfered with contractual relations,
although no breach had occurred. In Better Value Furniture, the bcca upheld the injunction on
the ground that the threat to picket a non-allied employer constituted tortious inducement of
a breach of contract. On this point, Hutcheon dissented; he interpreted the statute as granting
unions immunity from actions for interference with contractual relations arising out of lawful
strikes. In British Columbia Ferry, the court remitted the matter to the lower court. See also
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the number of pickets to six instead of banning picketing altogether, while
in the other it prohibited unlawful obstruction instead of limiting the
number of pickets as the trial judge had done on the basis that the large
number of pickets was itself a form of intimidation.66 These cases suggest
that a slightly more liberal attitude towards picketing was gaining some
traction in the bcca, although, as we shall see, it did not predominate.
THE CHARTER ERA: 1982-2008

The advent of the Charter raised unions’ hopes that constitutional
protection of freedom of expression and freedom of association would
create more scope for trade union activity than was previously allowed.
However, the bcca did everything it could to dash these hopes. The
bcca considered picketing less as a form of constitutionally protected
speech and more as a signal for action. Within the labour context, it
considered even peaceful consumer leafleting to be coercive. Despite its
negative view of picketing in Charter cases, of the five cases decided on
non-Charter grounds, unions won four, more than doubling the labour
movement’s victories before the bcca.
In the first Charter challenge to restrictions on picketing to reach
the bcca, Dolphin Delivery, Justice William Esson, writing for himself
and Justice John Taggart, rejected the argument that picketing was a
constitutionally protected expression because the picketing in question
(even though no picketing had yet occurred) “was not of a kind which
had as its purpose or object the conveying of information or opinion, or
of persuading anyone to a point of view, or any purpose or object which
could reasonably come within the term ‘expression.’”67 In support of this
conclusion, Esson drew on the work of Paul Weiler, a respected former
chair of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board and labour law
scholar, who, in 1980, characterized union members’ response to picket
lines as “almost Pavlovian,”68 making picketing, in Esson’s view, not
the kind of rational expressive activity that deserved much in the way
66
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Holland America Cruises N.V. v. Gralewicz [1975] B.C.J. No. 5, upholding an injunction issued to
restrain threatened picketing against a cruise ship with a non-union crew.
Muckamuck Restaurant Ltd. v. Service, Office and Retail Workers Union of Canada Local No. 1 et
al. (1979), 14 B.C.L.R. 97; Vancouver Museums and Planetarium Assn. v. Vancouver Municipal
and Regional Employees’ Union (1981), 27 B.C.L.R. 73. The basis for judicial jurisdiction in these
cases is not stated and, presumably, was not contested on appeal.
Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 et al. (1984), 10
D.L.R. (4th) 198, 212. He dismissed the claim that freedom of association protected picketing
on the ground that the freedom protected the right of individuals to join a union but did not
protect the purposes of the association or the means that it used to achieve its purposes.
Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) 79.
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of constitutional protection.69 In a concurring judgment, Justice H.E.
Hutcheon held that all peaceful picketing is constitutionally protected
expression. However, he upheld the injunction on the basis that the
limitation of expressive activities that interfered with contractual relations
was demonstrably justifiable.70 The bcca also rejected the claim that
freedom of association protected picketing on the ground that freedom
of association protected the rights of individuals to join associations
but not the purposes or means used by associations to achieve their
purposes.71
Dolphin was appealed to the scc, where Justice William McIntyre,
a graduate of the bcca,72 writing for the majority, agreed with Hutcheon
both that picketing was protected expression and that restrictions placed upon
it were demonstrably justified. Like Esson, however, McIntryre also quoted
with approval Weiler’s characterization of picketing’s signal effect.73
The next Charter case involved picketing before the court houses of
the province, and the BC judiciary acted with righteous indignation to
ensure that unions got the justice the judiciary believed they deserved.
During a strike by government workers, Chief Justice Allan McEachern,
of the British Columbia Supreme Court, arrived at work one day to find
court workers on lawful strike picketing the court house. He issued an
injunction on his own initiative ordering the union and its members to
stop picketing at courts across the province and, subsequently, refused
the union’s application to dissolve the injunction.74
On appeal, the bcca, in the first picketing judgment signed by the
court instead of identifying the author, found it obvious that access to
the courts would be inhibited by the presence of peaceful picketers,
despite the fact that there was not a shred of evidence that anyone had
been deterred from entering the court house. The court also rejected the
argument that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction on its own
motion since the Labour Code gave the labour board exclusive jurisdiction
69
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Supra note 67 at 213.
Ibid. at 203-05. It has previously been determined by the British Columbia labour board that
Dolphin Delivery was not an ally of Purolator, the company that was in a labour dispute
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Ibid. at 208.
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over picketing. Citing one of its earlier decisions,75 the bcca held that
the Code did not oust the jurisdiction of the court to control picketing
that violated the general and civil law. The picketing in this case was
clearly in violation of the general law – the law relating to contempt
of court: “It would be a monstrous situation, indeed, if a citizen were
forced to delay or lose his Charter rights due to picketing or any other
interference with his or her access to the courts.”76 The bcca was equally
dismissive of the claim that the injunction infringed the very Charter
rights that it was acting to preserve. It had “no doubt that the right of
access to the courts is under the rule of law one of the foundational pillars
protecting the rights and freedoms of our citizens”77 and, thus, amply
justified restricting picketers’ freedom of expression. On appeal, the scc
affirmed the bcca’s decision and was just as vociferous in denouncing
court house picketing.78
The bcca was also dismissive of the claim that the Charter protected
consumer leafleting in support of a strike. In Kmart, employees on a
lawful strike at two stores leafleted consumers at two other non-unionized
Kmart stores. The Industrial Relations Council, the renamed administrative tribunal administering the Labour Relations Code, restrained the
leafleting as unlawful picketing. The union challenged the decision on the
basis that it violated the striking workers’ freedom of expression. Writing
for a unanimous bcca, Justice D.B. Hinds accepted that the activities in
question were protected expressive activity but found the restriction was
justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The consumer leafleting was equivalent
to traditional picketing in terms of its purpose and effect, and, as such,
the analysis of the scc in Dolphin Delivery, which set a low standard
for justifying the restriction, applied.79 On appeal, a unanimous scc
reversed the bcca, drawing a very sharp distinction between consumer
leafleting, which it associated with “informed and rational discourse,”
and picketing, which, in the court’s view, had a coercive element.80
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Re British Columbia Government Employees’ Union and Attorney-General of British Columbia
et al. (1985), 20 D.L.R. (4th) 399, 404.
Ibid, 406.
(1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 1. For a biting and insightful critique, see H.J. Glasbeek, “Contempt
for Workers,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 28 (1990): 1.
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1518 v. Kmart Canada (1997), 149 D.L.R. (4th) 119.
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During this period, the bcca has also resolved eight non-Charter
picketing cases based on the law regulating picketing discussed in the
previous section, and unions were successful in five. Three cases dealt
with disputes over whether the picketing was federally or provincially
regulated. In one case, Hecate Logging,81 the bcca upheld a lower court
decision that the matter fell within federal jurisdiction and affirmed the
injunction that had been issued; however, in two other cases, it found
that the dispute came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial
labour board and therefore dismissed applications for injunctions.82 In
another case, challenging the scope of the Labour Code’s limitation of
judicial jurisdiction over picketing, a unanimous court held that statutory
bar against legal actions in relation to “petty trespass to land to which a
member of the public ordinarily has access” did not preclude an action for
trespass. Thus, it was up to the bcca to determine whether the trespass in
question was petty or not. The effect of this interpretation is that the court
retains the jurisdiction to determine the nature of the trespass that was
committed and, hence, whether an action can be brought in court.83
In its decisions on the scope of lawful picketing, the bcca also seems
more pluralistic now than in the past. In one case, it upheld an injunction
requiring pickets to maintain a minimum distance from the employer’s
premises. 84 However, three others, especially two recent decisions
authored by Justice Ian T. Donald, represent a clearer break with the
bcca’s traditional hostility to picketing.85 In the first decision, Donald
started from “the principle that the courts intervene in labour disputes
as little as possible,”86 a principle to which the bcca had never even paid
lip service. He also regarded picketing as a legitimate tactic during a
labour dispute: “[t]he parties are engaged in an economic struggle. The
Union and its members have only two lawful weapons, the withdrawal
of labour and picketing. Having exercised their right to picket peacefully,
they should not have to operate with the sword of contempt over their
81
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Hecate Logging Ltd. v. I.W.A., Local I-85 (1988), 29 B.C.L.R. (2nd) 318.
A.T.M. Automatic Teller Machines, Services, Ltd. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 213 (1985), 22
D.L.R. (4th) 282; Maz Tudor Inns Ltd. v. Canadian Assn. of Smelter and Allied Workers (1985),
24 D.L.R. (4th) 317.
Gateway Casinos LP v. bcgeu, (2007), 67 B.C.L.R (4th) 225.
Rogers Cable T.V. Ltd. v. I.B.E.W., Local 230 (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 535.
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heads.”87 The two other judges on the panel agreed that the court should
be especially careful not to go farther than necessary when deciding to
enjoin picketing during a legal strike.88
In the second case, Donald reversed a lower court decision granting an
injunction against picketing at Prince Rupert grain terminals by a union
that was locked out by its employer at the Port of Vancouver terminals.89
In reversing the lower court, Donald held that the judge had erroneously
relied on the categorical distinction between primary picketing and
secondary picketing, recently abolished by the scc.90 Moreover, he held
that the signalling effect of picketing did not make it wrongful.91
It remains to be seen whether Donald’s more liberal attitude towards
picketing becomes the predominant one. As a practitioner, Donald
frequently appeared as counsel for a variety of unions, including the
Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical, and Allied Workers;
the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers; and the BC
Council of Carpenters. He also wrote a critique of the court’s reassertion
of its power to issue injunctions despite the 1973 Labour Code’s grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the labour board.92 But, he is clearly not alone in
his more pro-labour views since four different judges joined him in the
two opinions.93 In the context of her decision in a case involving picketing
before an abortion clinic, Justice Mary Southin’s characterization of the
bcca’s older labour picketing jurisprudence reflected her earlier opinion,
written while she was still a practitioner:
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“trespass” and “pretty trespass” to narrow the scope of the labour board’s exclusive jurisdiction
over picketing.
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I think it is not unfair or unkind to say that by the 1950’s, the courts
of British Columbia were thought by some to be anti-labour because
of the number of injunctions granted in labour disputes … There is
much to be said for the proposition that [precedents developed during
the course of labour disputes] should be put permanently away and the
court should give, in these cases where citizens take to the streets and
an injunction is sought, a fresh consideration to the extent to which the
court should go.94

CONCLUSION

In its first hundred years, the bcca considered thirty-eight picketing
cases. These resulted in eight union victories and two split decisions.
In twenty-eight cases the union was the appellant, and it lost outright
70 percent of the time. Employers were the appellants in ten cases and
won eight, an 80 percent success rate. In some ways, the numbers speak
for themselves and reflect the strength and consistency of the beliefs of
a large majority of the bcca judges who sat on such cases that picketing
was inherently coercive – it had a signalling effect – and that the privilege
to trade was of significantly greater social value than the privilege of
workers to act collectively. However, what the numbers do not reveal
is (1) the internal opposition of a minority of judges, particularly in the
first sixty years of the court’s history, to the restrictive approach adopted
by the majority and (2) the signs of a possible shift in recent years. As
well, the numbers do not reveal the reasons for the bcca’s remarkable
record, so here we offer some explanations for it. Typically, attempts
to explain judicial decision making offer some combination of internal
and external reasons. We can partially account for the bcca’s record
by pointing to strictures of precedent and traditional common law
values reflected in precedent, such as individual autonomy, freedom of
contract, and the fundamental importance of property rights. While
clearly this is part of the explanation, it fails to account for the fact that
most bcca judges were generally less willing than were judges in other
Canadian jurisdictions, including the scc, to acknowledge that workers
also enjoyed recognized legal privileges to engage in associational
and expressive activities that advance their legitimate self-interest in
obtaining improved terms and conditions of employment and that the
accommodation of those privileges required some limitation on the
rights that employers claimed. The so-called “taught tradition of the
94
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common law”95 neither dictated nor fully explains the bcca’s consistent
hostility to picketing.
So we must also turn to external or contextual factors to explain
the bcca’s record on picketing. When studying individual decisions
or judges it is possible to turn to judicial biography to understand how
the background of a judge affected a judgment. We provided this kind
of information about a few of the bcca justices who participated in the
picketing cases, but it is beyond the scope of this article to investigate
the backgrounds of the more than forty justices involved in the thirtyseven judgments we discussed, to construct a collective portrait of the
bcca, or to look at institutional factors such as recruitment processes
or patterns that may have shaped the court over its one-hundred-year
history. Indeed, while the articles in this special issue of BC Studies
contribute towards a better understanding of the bcca, there is not yet a
book-length history of the court that provides this kind of biographical
or institutional information.96 That said, in their introduction to this
special issue, Hamar Foster and John McLaren point to the “corporate
mindset” that characterized the judges who were appointed to the bcca
for much of its history, while also acknowledging that, in recent decades,
there has been greater diversity in the backgrounds of appointees.97 While
this pattern may not be unique to British Columbia, it provides a partial
explanation for the pattern of decision making we found.
We are also of the view that the bcca’s jurisprudence is related to the
social context of labour relations and features unique to British Columbia.
Historically, British Columbia has been more densely unionized – as high
as 51 percent in the 1950s – compared to other provinces. Class relations
also have been more polarized and turbulent on the west coast than
they have been elsewhere in Canada. This is because for much of British
Columbia’s history unions in the province tended to be politically radical
and organizationally militant, while key employers were closely aligned
to the provincial government. Moreover, the resource-based economy
was vulnerable to swings in the world economy, resulting in an unstable
and conflict-prone labour market.98 In this context, it is not surprising
95

96

97
98

Roscoe Pound, “The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Tort,” Harvard Law Review
53 (1940): 365 at 367.
Histories have been produced for some courts. For example, see Dale Brawn, The Court of
Queen’s Bench of Manitoba, 1870-1959: A Biographical History (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2006). And there will soon be a book-length history of the bcca. See Hamar Foster
and John McLaren, “For the Better Administration of Justice” in this issue at 24.
Foster and McLaren, ibid. at 16.
British Columbia had larger and longer strikes than the other provinces because of the degree
of centralization in the key resource sectors (i.e., forestry, mining, and fishing). It also had
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that the majority of the BC judicial elite would treat with suspicion and
at times hostility the union tactic – picketing – that most clearly called
upon class solidarity and that demonstrated the potential for organized
workers to disrupt not only their immediate employer’s operations but
also the wider economy.99

99

a vibrant socialist party and was the Canadian heartland of the Industrial Workers of the
World. See Jean Barman, The West beyond the West: A History of British Columbia, 3rd ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007); Fudge and Tucker, Labour before the Law; Paul
Phillips, No Power Greater (Vancouver: BC Federation of Labour, Boag Foundation, 1967).
Most picketing cases that reached the bcca, especially in the early years, did not arise from
strikes in the resource sector but, rather, from urban picketing aimed at persuading consumers
to refrain from patronizing struck businesses. Perhaps heightened class tensions and more
solidaristic labour traditions made this kind of picketing all the more threatening to elites,
including judges.
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